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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-THE AUTOMATIC STANDING
RULE IN POSSESSION CASES IS OVERRULED. United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
On the basis of an affidavit of a Massachusetts state police
trooper a search warrant was issued for the apartment of Jean Zack-
ular. The affidavit stated that a reliable, unnamed informant had
told the trooper of conversations between the informant and Joseph
Zackular. According to the affidavit Zackular had told the inform-
ant that a check writing machine used to print checks on stolen
check forms was located at the apartment of Jean Zackular. During
the search of the apartment, stolen checks were found. As a result of
the discovery of the checks, John Salvucci and Joseph Zackular
were charged with unlawful possession of stolen checks.
The defendants moved to suppress the checks on the ground
that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was inadequate to
demonstrate probable cause. The government contended that the
defendants lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
search because they did not have a possessory interest in the place
searched. The federal district court for the state of Massachusetts
held that the affidavit was deficient because it was based on double
hearsay and failed to specify the dates on which information in-
cluded in the affidavit had been obtained. The court ordered the
suppression of the checks. The government sought reconsideration
of the district court's ruling. The district court reaffirmed its order
and the government appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding
that the defendants had standing under the automatic standing rule
of Jones v. United States.' The court ruled that the defendants were
not required to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
premises searched or the property seized. The court questioned the
vitality of the Jones rule, but refused to overrule it.2 Certiorari was
1. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
2. United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094 (1st Cir. 1979).
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granted by the United States Supreme Court.' The Court held that
the automatic standing rule was no longer valid and expressly over-
ruled Jones. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited by the
fourth amendment. To give effect to this prohibition the Supreme
Court has established an exclusionary rule which prevents the use of
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.5 The pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures is viewed as a
personal right. A defendant may challenge the legality of a search
only if he can establish that he was actually the victim of an inva-
sion of privacy, and he may not vicariously assert the violation of
another's rights.6
In finding standing to object to a search, courts have tradition-
ally required that the defendant have either a possessory interest in
the place searched or an ownership interest in the thing seized.7 In
the Jones decision, the Court broadened the circumstances under
which standing could be found. The Court was there faced with a
defendant who was charged with illegal possession of narcotics, but
who had been denied standing to challenge the seizure of the very
narcotics he was alleged to have possessed. The Court held that a
defendant has automatic standing to object to the search for, and the
seizure of, contraband when he is charged with a crime of which
possession of the contraband is a key element.
3. United States v. Salvucci, 444 U.S. 989 (1979).
4. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
6. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1969). To prevent the vicarious assertion of constitutional rights courts require that the
person asserting such rights have "standing." Standing refers to the status of having such
sufficient property or possessory interest in the place searched or the thing seized as to be
entitled to challenge the search and seizure.
7. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Lovette v. United States, 230 F.2d 263
(5th Cir. 1956); Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1955); Washington v.
United States, 202 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Scoggins v. United States, 202 F.2d 211 (D.C.
Cir. 1953); Gorland v. United States, 197 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1952); United States v. Pisano,
193 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1951); Grainger v. United States, 158 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1946); In re
Nassetta, 125 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1942); McMillan v. United States, 26 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1928);
Graham v. United States, 15 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1926); Goldberg v. United States, 297 F. 98
(5th Cir. 1924); MacDaniel v. United States, 294 F. 269 (6th Cir. 1924).
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The Court's opinion stated two reasons for establishing an au-
tomatic standing rule. First, to establish standing in possession
cases a defendant would have to give testimony at the suppression
hearing which, if used at trial, would tend to convict him. At the
time of Jones some lower courts allowed the use of such testimony
at trial.' A defendant was faced with the dilemma of choosing be-
tween his fourth amendment right to object to an illegal search and
seizure and his fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself.
Automatic standing removed him from this dilemma by relieving
him of the need to give incriminating testimony.
The second reason given for the automatic standing rule was
that the government should not be allowed to take the contradictory
positions of asserting that the defendant possessed the contraband
for purposes of violation of the criminal statute, but not for purposes
of claiming his fourth amendment protection. The automatic stand-
ing rule forced the government to take the position that the defend-
ant possessed the contraband for all purposes.
The expansive protection given to defendants in possession
cases by the decision in Jones has steadily declined. The first case to
place a limitation upon the automatic standing rule was Brown v.
United States,9 in which the Supreme Court restricted the applica-
tion of the automatic standing rule to situations in which possession
at the time of the search and seizure was an element of the crime.
Prior to the decision in Brown the automatic standing rule had been
applied in all possession cases regardless of when the possession was
alleged to have occurred. In Brown the defendants were charged
with possession of stolen property. The charge, however, related to
the possession of the stolen goods up to the time of their delivery to
the place that was eventually searched; therefore, the Court was able
to rule that the automatic standing rule did not apply. The auto-
matic standing rule and standing as a whole was dealt a severe blow
in Rakas v. Illinois,'0 in which standing as a separate inquiry was
abandoned. Prior to Rakas courts used a two step inquiry. The first
inquiry was whether the defendant had standing to object to the
search. The second was whether the search had in fact violated the
defendant's constitutional rights. After Rakas there is a single in-
quiry concerning whether there was a violation of a "legitimate ex-
8. Fowler v. United States, 239 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1956); Kaiser v. United States, 60
F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1932); Heler v. United States, 57 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1932).
9. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
10. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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pectation of privacy in the invaded place."" That is, did the police
invade a place that the defendant would reasonably believe was safe
from intrusion by others so that property placed there would not be
disturbed?
Brown and Rakas thus set the stage for the Supreme Court to
abandon the automatic standing rule of Jones. In Salvucci the
Court did so.' 2 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated that
the bases for the automatic standing rule no longer exist. First, the
dilemma of a defendant having to choose between claiming his pro-
tection under the fourth amendment and retaining his privilege
against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment had been re-
moved by Simmons v. United States. 3 It was held there that testi-
mony given by a defendant to establish standing to object to
illegally seized evidence may not be used against him at his trial on
the question of guilt or innocence. Second, the decision in Rakas
settled the objection concerning the government taking contradic-
tory positions regarding the defendant's possession of contraband by
holding that a legitimate expectation of privacy had to be shown in
order to challenge the legality of a search. Legal possession of an
object seized during an illegal search does not guarantee a sufficient
fourth amendment interest to allow the owner to protest the
search.' 4 In other words, possession of an object does not necessar-
ily mean that there is a legitimate expectation of privacy concerning
it.
Justice Rehnquist further stated that the automatic standing
rule was no longer useful in the determination of fourth amendment
rights. He emphasized that under the rule evidence was being lost
which would prove a defendant's guilt. Also, defendants were being
allowed to raise fourth amendment objections when in fact their
constitutional rights had not been violated.
The Supreme Court's analysis was weak in finding that the ba-
ses for the automatic standing rule no longer exist. Simmons did not
relieve a defendant from having to choose between his fourth and
fifth amendment rights. True, testimony given by a defendant at a
suppression hearing cannot be used at trial as evidence of guilt or
innocence. However, such testimony could probably be used at trial
11. Id at 140. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring).
12. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980).
13. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
14. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
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for impeachment purposes. ' 5 A number of courts have so held.16 A
defendant would almost surely have to admit a possessory interest
in the contraband in order to challenge a search and seizure. This
testimony would be admissible against him at trial should he testify
that he did not possess the contraband. He would therefore be
placed in the position of having to choose between objecting to an
unconstitutional search and testifying in his own behalf. The de-
fendant should not be placed in such a position.
Justice Rehnquist was correct in stating that the objection to the
government taking contrary positions was removed if, as stated in
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 7 possession does not give rise to 'fourth
amendment rights. However, possession of the object seized has
long been a valid basis for raising fourth amendment objections. 18
The fourth amendment protects "effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."' 9 Limiting this protection to instances where
there is a "legitimate" expectation of privacy is too narrow a reading
of the fourth amendment. It raises the possibility that the fourth
amendment's protection will be available only when the accused can
show that he could, and did in fact, exclude others from access to
the seized object. Availability of the object to others, even accom-
plices, may be ruled sufficient to deny the existence of a legitimate
expectation of privacy. The burden of proving such an interest is
too excessive.
The Court's emphasis on the prosecutorial cost of the automatic
standing rule, the loss of probative evidence, ignores the true pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule. The primary purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is to deter illegal searches.2" Certainly, the application
of the exclusionary rule in conjunction with the automatic standing
rule resulted in the release of defendants who were in truth guilty of
the crime with which they had been charged. However, that is the
price to be paid if illegal searches and seizures are to be prevented.
As a result of Salvucci, the police may be encouraged to violate one
15. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 93 (1980); see Jenkens v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231 (1980); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975); United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971). But see New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
16. People v. Douglas, 66 Cal. App. 3d 998, 136 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1977); People v. Sturgis,
58 IlI. 2d 211, 317 N.E.2d 545 (1974); Gray v. State, 43 Md. App. 238, 403 A.2d 853 (1979).
17. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
18. See cases cited note 7 supra. See also Cantrell v. United States, 15 F.2d 953 (5th
Cir. 1926).
19. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
20. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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person's rights in the hope of finding evidence that could be used
against another. Most police officers will not intentionally violate
the rights of others. However, there are some who will. The fourth
amendment and the exclusionary rule are directed at them. The
Supreme Court should be supporting the Constitution and insuring
the protections it offers rather than sacrificing individual rights for a
few additional criminal convictions.
Timothy D. Brewer
